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Despite the fact that women may be active participants in armed conflicts as 
soldiers, they are still mostly the victims. Violation against women during war 
time is not just an act of sexual violence, but rather a method of warfare, i.e., an 
instrument of revenge and a means of dishonouring not just the woman, but “her 
man“ and in the end the whole nation. Through the case-law of the Internatio-
nal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter: ICTR) it has become 
obvious that the crime of rape is no longer a matter of state, but that it has been 
recognized as a crime on the international level – as a crime against humanity, 
serious war crime, and (in some cases where we can fortify and sustain a mens 
rea) even genocide. The fact that many women do not acknowledge what happened 
- because of the traditional upbringing and rigid religious systems, is at the same 
time interesting and daunting. In many cases being a rape victim is a shame for 
the raped woman. 
Key words: armed conflicts; rape; ICTY; ICTR; crime against humanity; war 
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1 IntrodUCtIon
Rape is a crime which violates the rights of the attacked woman in the 
most intimate way possible. It often results in traumatic, long-lasting psycho-
logical trauma that includes shock, shame, guilt, humiliation, paralyzing fear 
of injury or death, a strong sense of defilement, loss of control over life, and 
the like. These psychological consequences are compounded when the rape is 
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committed during war time; at that time the victim may also have experienced 
many additional negative emotions – the death of relatives, dislocation, injuri-
es, loss of home or possessions, or even unwanted pregnancy.1 
Women are being raped in all forms of armed conflicts (international and 
non-international), regardless of the nature of the conflict – religious, political, 
national, ethnic or some other, or as a combination of all, with no predicted 
enemy.2 Rape in the case of war is not merely a matter of chance, or women 
victims being in the wrong place at the wrong time, nor a question of sex. It is 
rather a question of power and control and it could erode the community in a 
way that few weapons can. 
The damage inflicted by rape can be devastating due to the strong commu-
nal reaction to the violation and pain stamped on women’s families. In many 
societies and cultures, raped women are shunned or fear ostracism from their 
families and communities and mental or physical repulsion from their relati-
ves. The Muslim culture for instance, has attached a profound stigma to rape 
that has resulted in a reluctance of victims to report the crime (according   to 
the ICTY’s case-law). For a traditional Muslim woman to be raped means that 
she has become an outsider in her own family and community, even if she ener-
getically resisted her attacker and is a true victim! She has become soiled or 
defiled. In the conservative Muslim culture, the rape of woman is considered 
not “just” as a personal attack, but also as an attack on the woman’s family.3 
If the woman is single, she will be deemed not eligible to marry. On the other 
hand, if she is married, she will try to hide the rape from her husband for fear 
that he might divorce her or even kill her for her impurity.4
Violence against women may be directed towards the social group of which 
she is a member, because in many traditional and conservative systems – rape 
of women is a humiliation for the entire community. It is the consequence of 
a belief that women are seen as the reproducers and carriers of their societies. 
Also men of raped women could experience a profound sense of shame or 
defeat for having failed to protect their women. Men of a conquered nation 
1 Healey, “Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia“, 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (1995) 2, at 327.
2 Women are raped by men from both sides – members of enemy and/or friendly for-
ces, or even by members of UN peacekeeping forces.
3 Aydelott, “Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under Internatio-
nal Law“, 7 Emory International Law Review (1993) 2, at 602.
4 Davis, “The Politics of Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime“, 34 The International 
Lawyer (2000) 4, at 1237.
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traditionally view rape of their women as the ultimate humiliation and a severe 
impact on their sexuality or manhood.
2 hIstorY oF rape as a Weapon oF War
The sexual abuse of women during war has been recognized for centuries, 
subsumed under outrages on personal dignity, and incorporated into the main 
military codes of their time. 
For example, the military codes of Richard II (1385) and Henry V (1419) 
both subjected violators to capital punishment.5 In addition, the Leiber Code 
listed rape as a specific offence, categorizing it as a capital offence.6 Furthermo-
re, by broad interpretation it can be said that the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regu-
lations entail provisions concerning rape. For instance, the Hague Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states in part that family 
honour and rights, the life of person and private property, as well as religious 
conviction and practice must be respected.7 
In the last century, perceptions of rape in war were shifted, departing from 
something that is inevitable, when men are deprived of female companionship 
for a prolonged period of time, to an actual “war tactic”. 
Criminal prosecutions after the 2nd World War reinforced the prohibition 
of rape and other sexual violence. Although it was not codified in the Charters 
of the International Military Tribunals, some evidence of sexual violence was 
presented before them, most notably before the International Military Tribu-
nal for the Far East.8 Unfortunately, in those trials, acts of sexual violence and 
rape were not placed at the level that would allow them to stand alone. The 
Tribunal and its lawyers, while deserving ample credit for presenting the evi-
dence and recognizing the atrociousness of the offences committed against wo-
men, lumped the acts of sexual violence under the residual umbrella of Crimes 
5 Meron, “Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law“, 87 American 
Journal of International Law (1993) 3, at 424 – 425. 
6 Lieber code, see Art. 44 and 47.
7 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 46.
8 The Tokyo International Military Tribunal convicted generals Toyoda and Matsui of 
command responsibility for violations of the laws or customs of war committed by 
their soldiers in Nanking, which includes rapes and sexual assaults. The former Fo-
reign Minister of Japan, Hirota, was also convicted for these atrocities. See B. V. A. 
Roeling and C. F Rueter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East, (1977) I, at 385.
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against Humanity - Inhumane Treatment.9 The same qualification was made 
for the “deliberate destruction of the members of national, racial or religious 
groups, such as the Poles, Jews, Gypsies and others“, which will be recognized 
as a crime of genocide a few years later. 
After the 2nd World War rape was prohibited by the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter: 
Geneva Convention IV). It states that women shall be especially protected 
against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitu-
tion, or any form of indecent assault.10 Even though the essence of the whole 
corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lie in 
the protection of the human dignity of every person, regardless of the gender 
issue, these provisions additionally underline the necessity of proclaiming that 
women must be treated with special consideration.11 
Furthermore, rape is specifically prohibited by the 1977 Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions and relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (hereinafter: Additional Protocol I). It also states that 
women shall be the object of special respect and protected in particular against 
rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.12 Moreover, 
rape is expressly prohibited by the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (hereinafter: Additional Protocol II). It forbids outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced pro-
stitution as well as any other form of indecent assault.13
The development in the last decade of the 20th century has led to the 
conclusion that it could be said that rape and sexual violence now have a firm 
9 On the historical occurrence of rape in armed conflict see more: Davis, supra note 4, 
at 1225 – 1228, 1233; Healey, supra note 1, at 329 – 330.
10 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 973, Art. 27(2).
11 This paragraph is based on a provision introduced into the Prisoners of War Conven-
tion in 1929, and on the proposal submitted to the International Committee by the 
International Women’s Congress and the International Federation of Abolitionist. 
See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 1949, Vol. II-A, at 821.
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, Art. 76(1).
13 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Art. 4.
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foothold as specifically enumerated offences under international humanitarian 
law. For the first time rape was specifically codified as a recognizable and inde-
pendent crime within the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR.14 These two historic 
international instruments, together with the Rome Statute of the Internatio-
nal Criminal Court,15 now represent the foundation upon which crimes of rape 
and sexual violence are punished. 
The Rome Statute has further advanced the work of the international cri-
minal ad hoc tribunals. Gender crimes are no longer subsumed under outrages 
on personal dignity. Rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and other forms 
of sexual violence are now expressly enumerated as crimes against humanity, 
as well as war crimes referring to both international and non-international 
armed conflicts. Goldstone concludes that the Rome Statute represents the 
normative benchmark of international criminal law, and gender crimes are now 
given the recognition that has been denied to them for a long time.16 Despite 
the historical prohibition of wartime rape by national codes of conduct, states 
have been hesitant to prosecute rape as a war crime. In Carlton’s opinion, the 
reason for that attitude may be the men-dominated leadership in most of the 
world’s governments, as well as the fact that international humanitarian law 
has been drafted and interpreted primarily by men. In addition, reluctance 
to recognize rape as a gender-specific crime could be a side effect of the male 
cultural control and resistance to disturb the status quo among other things.17 
In June 2008 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1820, which stresses effective steps to prevent and respond to acts of sexual 
violence that can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security.18 The Security Council noted that women and girls are par-
14 Both Tribunals were established pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Inter-
national Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Former Yugoslavia sin-
ce 1991, was established pursuant to Security Council resolution S/Res/827(1993), 
25 May 1993. See also: Secretary General Report, S/257074, from 3 May 1993, pa-
ras. 19 – 20. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution S/Res/955(1994), 8 November 1994.
15 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90. 
16 Goldstone, “Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime“, 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law (2002) 3, at 285.
17 Carlton, “Equalized Tragedy: Prosecuting Rape in the Bosnian Conflict Under the 
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugosla-
via“, 6 Journal of International Law and Practice (1997) 1, at 106.
18 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1820 (2008), 19 June 2008, para. 1.
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ticularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, both as a tactic of war to humi-
liate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members 
of a community or ethnic group. The Resolution demanded the immediate 
and complete cessation by all parties to the armed conflict of all acts of sexual 
violence against civilians, and taking appropriate measures to protect civilians, 
including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence.19 Hence, this 
Resolution makes a direct link between crimes of sexual violence and conflicts 
that may rumble on for years. 
3  rape Cases In the Former YUGosLavIa and rWanda In 
the earLY 1990s
During the last two decades international media attention has been di-
rected towards various expressions and significant number of widespread and 
systematic rapes, torture and forced pregnancies in war-torn regions in Rwan-
da and former Yugoslavia. 
Sexual violence against Tutsi women in Rwanda was systematically incor-
porated in the widespread attacks against the members of the Tutsi tribe. Sto-
ries of rape, along with reports of mass systematic killing surfaced as a part 
of the attempted genocide of the Tutsis by Hutu officials and soldiers. Over 
ten percent of Rwandan citizens were slaughtered, thousands of women and 
girls were held, publicly gang-raped, tortured, and then killed. For example, 
as it was concluded in one of the ICTR’s judgements, the accused (Sylvestre 
Gacumbitsi) circulated around the area in a vehicle announcing by megaphone 
that Tutsi women should be raped and sexually degraded. Attacks and rapes 
of Tutsi women followed immediately thereafter, often serving as a prelude to 
murder.20 In some raids in Rwanda, virtually every adolescent girl who sur-
vived an attack by the militia was subsequently raped. Many of those who 
became pregnant were ostracized by their families and communities. Some 
abandoned their babies, while others committed suicide.
In the former Yugoslavia rape was organized, systematic and massive. In 
many cases it was committed in particularly sadistic ways to inflict maxi-
mum humiliation on the victims, their families, and on the whole commu-
19 Ibid., paras. 2 and 3. 
20 Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Judgement (hereinafter: Gacumbitsi Trial Judge-
ment), ICTR-2001-64-T, 17 June 2004, para. 198.
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nity. Reports suggested widespread sexual abuse and repeated rapes of girls 
as young as six; gang rapes so brutal that the victims died after that; rapes by 
neighbours; rapes in front of mothers, father and relatives; rapes committed 
explicitly to impregnate women and hold them captive until they gave birth to 
the perpetrator’s child. Brothers or fathers of these women were often forced 
to rape them as well. If they refused, they were killed.21 
In the early 1990s revelations about concentration camps became a regular 
part of the world’s daily news from the region. The first reports of rapes that 
occurred in the former Yugoslavia came to light in 1992, when refugees fleeing 
the war-torn region recounted atrocities that included stories of different ways 
of raping. Women were kept in various detention centres where they were 
systematically raped. Systematic rape was often used as a weapon of war in the 
process of “ethnic cleansing“, a special method of crime against humanity.22 
Rape itself in the former Yugoslavia had become a weapon of war; in Davis’s 
opinion – a tool of the military in conquering and dispersing the Muslim and 
Croat people.23
Most probably we will never know the exact number of women and girls 
raped during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Estimates of the number of 
women raped in Bosnia and Herzegovina vary widely from 10000 to 60000 
women and girls, regardless of their ethnic or national affiliation. They were 
raped in their homes, schools or concentration camps all over the region. 
The European Community sent a team of experts to investigate the reports 
of rape cases. A confidential interim report, issued in early 1993, estimated 
that Bosnian Serb soldiers had raped 20000 Muslim women.24 
21 For instance, in Omarska camp, on June 26 1992, guards tried to force Mehmedalija 
Sarajlic, an elderly Bosnian Muslim to rape a female detainee. After he refused, the 
soldiers beat him to death. See Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Judgement (hereinafter: 
Brdanin Trial Judgement), IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004, para. 516.
22 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Reporter appointed by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, concluded that rape was used not only as an instrument of war, as 
an attack on the individual victim, but as a method of ethnic cleansing intended to 
humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire ethnic group. See Report on the si-
tuation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Tade-
usz Mazowiecki, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1, E/CN.4/1993/50, 
10 February 1993, para. 85.
23 Davis, supra note 4, at 1236.
24 Aydelott, supra note 3, at 604.
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Amnesty International also released a report during 1993 on the issue of 
rape. The report warned that, since mass rape is being used as a propaganda 
weapon by Bosnia, any estimates of the number of rapes and victims must be 
treated with caution. Amnesty International investigators could not verify the 
European Community committee’s estimate of 20000 victims.25 
Catherine A. MacKinnon, who counselled several Croatian women’s orga-
nizations, set the number of rapes at 50000 in 1992.26 
In 1995, the UN War Crimes Commission head Cherif Bassiouni estimated 
12000 instances of both reported and unreported rape in the former Yugosla-
via.27 
Medical evidence about the refugees also provided useful information. In 
January 1993, an international team of four physicians, sent by the UN to 
investigate rapes in the former Yugoslavia, collected data on abortions, deli-
veries, known pregnancies due to rape, and sexually transmitted diseases. The 
team identified 119 pregnancies resulting from rape on a small sample of six 
hospitals in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The report noted 
that since medical studies indicate that a single act of unprotected intercourse 
will result in pregnancy between one and four percent of the time, the identifi-
cation of 119 pregnancies may represent more then 11900 rapes.28
Exceptional humiliating significance of many rape cases in former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda was the existence of the mass rapes practice. 
By Aydelott’s opinion, information relating to the mass-rape cases is to be 
taken with certain caution. Considering that mass rape is a strategy utilized 
only when one side is already winning the battle and gaining control over the 
enemy ground, its use as an effective military strategy is greatly overstated. As 
ground troops advance in enemy territory, the retreating side leaves behind 
women and children, and sexual sadism arises with astonishing rapidity. As the 
winning side does the raping, the losing side publicizes the rapes in an effort to 
convince the world that its enemy is so evil that other countries should band 
25 Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, 4 
(1993), at 3 – 4.
26 Mann, Rape and War Crimes, Washington Post, 13 January 1993, D22.
27 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992) UN SCOR, Addendum Annex IX, at 70-71, UN Doc 
s/1994/674/Add.2 (1995) (under the direction of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman 
and Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts).
28 Healey, supra note 1, at 372.
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together and help the losing side.29 Every major war has had its instances of 
mass rape.30
Nevertheless, such rapes, often committed in the public setting or in front of 
the mother, father and relatives, appear calculated to bring the resulting shame 
on the survivor’s family and community. As it was confirmed in the Cesic case, 
the family relationship and the fact that raped women were watched by others 
make the offence of humiliating and degrading treatment particularly serious.31 
The Trial Chamber in the Delalic and others case also confirmed that rape com-
mitted in the presence of others exacerbated the victim’s humiliation.32 
The presence of witnesses during rape as especially humiliating for the vic-
tim was also recognized in the ICTR’s case-law. One witness in the Akayesu case 
testified to the humiliation she felt as a mother, by being raped in the presence 
of her children: “Just thinking about it made the war come alive inside me.”33 
Another witness said that her mother begged the man to kill her daughter 
rather then rape them in front of her. The man replied that the principle was to 
make them suffer and the girl was raped after that.34 The Trial Chamber in the 
Musema case confirmed that humiliating utterances, which often accompany 
rape and he explicitly mentioned Musema’s declaration during one rape. He 
said: “The pride of the Tutsis is going to end today”.35
Humiliation is generally taken into account when assessing the gravity of 
a crime.36 An important factor when assessing such gravity is the vulnerability 
of the victims.37 Another important factor is the physical and mental trauma 
29 Aydelott, supra note 3, at 588.
30 See more: ibid., at 588 – 597.
31 Prosecutor v. Ranko Cesic, Sentencing Judgement (hereinafter: Cesic Sentencing Judge-
ment), IT95-10/1, 11 March 2004, para. 35.
32 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Judgement in 
the Trial Chamber (hereinafter: Delalic and others Trial Judgement), IT-96-21-T, 16 
November 1998, para. 1262.
33 Prosecutor v. Jean – Paul Akayesu, Judgement (hereinafter: Akayesu Trial Judgement), 
ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 423.
34 Ibid., at 430.
35 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Judgement and Sentence (hereinafter: Musema Trial Jud-
gement), ICTR-96-12-T, 27 January 2000, para. 907.
36 Cesic Sentencing Judgement, paras. 35, 53; Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenovic, Sentencing 
Judgment (hereinafter: Zelenovic Sentencing Judgement), IT-96-23/2-S, 4 April 
2007, para. 36.
37 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Judgement in the Appeal Chamber, IT-95-14-A, 29 July 
2004, para. 683; Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Judgement in the Appeal 
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suffered by the victim, even long after the commission of the crime.38 For 
example, the victims of sexual abuse in the detention centres in Foca (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) suffered unconceivable pain, indignity, and humiliation of 
being repeatedly violated, without knowing whether they would survive the 
ordeal. Most of the time, women would have to agonize through the day, not 
knowing what was to be their own fate in the coming night.39 As a result of 
the violent sexual assaults, the physical and psychological health of many of 
the victims was seriously damaged. The women and girls in the detention cen-
tres lived in constant fear of repeated rapes and sexual assault. Some became 
suicidal and others became indifferent to what happened to them. The scars 
left from the crimes committed against them were deep and might never heal. 
This, perhaps more than anything, according to the Zelenovic case conclusion, 
speaks about the gravity of the crimes.40
In response to all atrocities committed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
the UN Security Council established two international criminal ad hoctribu-
nals to investigate the crimes and to prosecute those responsible for them - the 
ICTY and the ICTR. 
ICTY’s and ICTR’s cases have also reinforced the legal basis for arguing 
that rape and sexual violence are individual crimes against humanity, a grave 
breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws of customs 
of war or an act of genocide, if the requisite elements are met. This jurispru-
dence handed down from both international criminal ad hoc tribunals has 
altered the landscape of criminal prosecution for good and affected the scope 
of consequences that any potential perpetrators must consider. 
It all started quietly within the ICTR in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu. 
This became a historic rule because for the first time rape was found to be 
an act of genocide.41 This landmark case is now the cornerstone of all future 
genocide and crimes against humanity prosecutions. In that case, for the first 
Chamber, IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para. 1088; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Ku-
narac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Judgement in the Trial Chamber (hereinafter: 
Kunarac and others Trial Judgement), IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, 
para. 352.
38 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, Judgement in Trial Chamber II, IT-98-32-T, 25 February 
2004, para. 167.
39 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Sentencing Judgement, IT-94-2-S, 18 December 2003, 
paras. 46, 194.
40 Zelenovic Sentencing Judgement, para. 40.
41 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507.
Zbornik PFZ, 60, (3) 1309-1334 (2010) 1319
time, rape and acts of sexual violence were put on equal footing with all other 
offences. 
In the late 1998, the ICTY produced equally historic precedents in two ca-
ses – in the case against Anto Furundzija,42 the first case to consist exclusively 
of rape charges,43 as well as in the Delalic and others case. These judgments reco-
gnized rape as a violation of laws and customs of war, and as a basis of torture 
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Recent advancements of international humanitarian law in the area of rape 
and sexual violence broaden the scope of individual criminal responsibility 
to leaders and commanders who lend their influence and tacitly encourage 
crimes against women. The Akayesu and the Furundzija decisions hold that offi-
cials and leaders can be directly responsible when they witness acts of sexual 
violence and rape committed by attackers, even when those attackers are not 
strictly under their chain of command. This is reasonable case-law in all armed 
conflicts, both internal and international, as well as in situations of genocide. 
What is more, the above is ever so important given that today’s paramilitary 
and militia command structures are often covertly organized and not easily 
defined. 
42 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgement in the Trial Chambers (hereinafter: Furun-
dzija Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998.
43 The most interesting aspect of this trial from the perspective of women’s advocates 
is that in June 1998, after the trial had been concluded, but before the verdict had 
been rendered, the prosecution revealed to the defense that one witness had been 
receiving counseling for the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the 
rape and interrogation. The symptoms of this disorder include: cronic suicidal preo-
ccupation; self-injury; explosive or extremely inhibited anger; reliving experiences, 
sense of helplessness, shame, guilt, and self-blame; a sense of defilement or stigma; 
and a sense of complete difference from others. See more: Davis, Patricia H., supra 
note 4, at 1241, note 155. The defense filed a motion to strike the testimony of that 
witness, or in the event of a conviction to receive a new trial. The Trial Chamber 
found that the evidence about psychological treatment was relevant to the issue of 
witness’s credibility, and so reopened the proceedings. Significantly, after hearing 
the testimony of the prosecution that witness’s credibility was diminished, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that PTSD does not render a person’s memory of traumatic 
events unworthy of belief. In fact, the expert evidence indicated that intense experi-
ences such as the events in this case are often remembered accurately despite some 
inconsistencies. The Trial Chamber noted that even when a person is suffering from 
PTSD, this does not mean that he or she is necessarily inaccurate in the evidence 
given, and concluded at the end that there is no reason why a person with PTSD 
cannot be a perfectly reliable witness. See: Furundzija Trial Judgement, paras. 105, 
109.
Sandra Fabijanić Gagro: The Crime of Rape in the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s Case-Law1320
 4 the deFInItIon oF rape In the ICtY’s and ICtr’s Case-LaW
No definition of rape can be found in international law. However, some ge-
neral indications can be discerned from the provisions of international treaties. 
In particular, attention must be drawn to the fact that there is prohibition of 
both “rape” and “any form of indecent assault” on women in the 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV (Art. 27), 1977 Additional Protocol I (Art. 76(1)) and 1977 
Additional Protocol II (Art. 4(2)). 
Hence, international criminal rules punish not only rape but also any se-
rious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration. It would seem that the 
prohibition embraces all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the 
physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force 
or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s 
dignity.44 The inference is warranted that international law, by specifically pro-
hibiting rape as well as, in general terms, other forms of sexual abuse, regards 
rape as the most serious manifestation of sexual assault. This is confirmed by 
the ICTY’s Statute (Art. 5), which explicitly provides for the prosecution of 
rape, while it implicitly covers other less grave forms of serious sexual assault 
through Article 5(i) as other inhumane acts.45
44 The principle of respect for human dignity is intended to shield human beings from 
outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by un-
lawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honor, the self-res-
pect or the mental well-being of a person. It is consonant with this principle that 
such an extremely serious sexual outrage as forced oral penetration should be classi-
fied as rape. The Trial Chamber in the Furundzija case, for example, holds that the 
forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humi-
liating and degrading attack upon human dignity. See: Furundzija Trial Judgement, 
paras. 183 – 184.
45 The parameters for the definition of human dignity can be found in international 
standards on human rights such as those laid down in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948, the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights of 
1966 and other international instruments on human rights or on humanitarian law. 
The expression at issue undoubtedly embraces such acts as serious sexual assaults 
short of rape proper (rape is specifically covered by Art. 27 of Geneva Conventi-
on IV and Art. 75 of Additional Protocol I, and mentioned in the Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
S/25704, para. 48), enforced prostitution (indisputably a serious attack on human 
dignity pursuant to most international instruments on human rights and covered 
by the provisions of humanitarian law just mentioned as well as the Report of the 
Secretary-General), or the enforced disappearance of persons (prohibited by the 
General Assembly Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992 and the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights of 1969).
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The Trial Chamber in the Furundzija case reviewed the various sources of 
international law and found that it was not possible to discern the elements 
of the crime of rape from international treaty or customary law, nor from the 
general principles of international criminal law or general principles of interna-
tional law. It concluded that to arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on 
the criminal law principle of specificity, it is necessary to look for principles of 
criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world. These principles 
may be derived, with all due caution, from national laws.46
Most legal systems, in spite of inevitable discrepancies, consider rape to be 
the forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or the forcible 
insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the anus. Such sexual 
activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim or a third party. 
In these circumstances victims become particularly vulnerable and their ability 
to make an informed refusal negated. The sexual activity occurs without the 
consent of the victim. As it was confirmed in the international criminal ad hoc 
tribunal’s case-law, consent for this purpose must be given voluntarily and of 
the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. 
The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowled-
ge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.47 The Trial Chamber in the 
Furundzija case emphasized that any form of captivity vitiates consent.48 The 
Trial Chamber in the Kvocka and others case endorses these holdings.49
According to one of the most famous decisions for the subject of rape, the 
Akayesu case decision before the ICTR, the Trial Chamber considered that the 
traditional mechanical definition of rape did not adequately capture its true 
nature and instead offered a definition of rape as physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed to a person under circumstances which are coercive. Whi-
le rape has been defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual 
intercourse, variations on the act of rape may include acts which involve the 
insertion of objects50 and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be 
46 Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 177.
47 Kunarac and others Trial Judgement, para. 460; Brdanin Trial Judgement, para. 
1008; Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Judgement and Sentence (hereinafter: Kajelijeli 
Trial Judgement), ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 2003, para. 915.
48 Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 271.
49 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac, 
Judgement in the Trial Chamber (hereinafter: Kvocka and others Trial Judgement), 
IT-98-30/1-T, 2 November 2001, para. 178.
50  The horrifying testimonies before the ICTR confirmed that in Rwandan conflict the 
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intrinsically sexual.51 The act of sexual violence which includes rape must be 
committed as part of a wide-spread or systematic attack on a civilian popula-
tion on certain catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely national, ethnic, 
political, racial, or religious grounds.52
Thus, sexual violence is broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexu-
al slavery or molestation.53 Moreover, the Akayesu Trial Chamber emphasized 
that sexual violence need not necessarily involve physical contact and cited 
forced public nudity as an example.54
The Akayesu conceptual definition of rape was approved in the Musema 
case,55 where the Trial Chamber highlighted the difference between “a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature” and “any act of a sexual nature” as being the diffe-
rence between rape and sexual assault.56 
Nevertheless, the “Akayesu definition” of rape has not been adopted per se 
in all subsequent jurisprudence of the international criminal ad hoc tribunals. 
The ICTR’s Trial Chambers in the Semanza case, the Kajelijeli case and the 
Kamuhanda case, for example, described only the physical elements of act of 
rape,57 and thus seemingly shifted their analyses away from the conceptual 
definition established in the Akayesu case.58
special type of humiliating women was by inserting objects in their genitals. See for 
example: Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 437; Gacumbitsi Trial Judgement, paras. 
201, 207, 215.
51 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 596.
52 Ibid., para. 598.
53 Sexual violence would also include such crimes as sexual mutilation, forced marria-
ge, and forced abortion as well as the gender related crimes explicitly listed in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, namely rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, en-
forced sterilization and other similar forms of violence. Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, at Art. 7(1)(g), Art. 
8(2)(b)(xxii), and Art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
54 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 688.
55 Musema Trial Judgement, para. 226. See also Prosecutor v. Mihaeli Muhimana, Judge-
ment and Sentence, ICTR-95-1B-T, 28 April 2005, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyi-
tegeta, Judgement, ICTR-96-14-T, 16 May 2003, para. 456.
56 Musema Trial Judgement, para. 227.
57 As set out in the Kunarac and others case, listed hereinafter.
58 See Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 915; Prosecutor v. Jean Dieu Kamuhanda, Judge-
ment, ICTR-95-54A-T, 22 January 2004, para. 706; Semanza Trial Judgement, pa-
ras. 344 – 345.
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The ICTY’s Trial Chamber in the Furundzija case articulated the objective 
elements of rape and found that based on its review of the national legislation 
of a number of states, the actus reus of the crime of rape is: i) the sexual pene-
tration, however slight of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or of the mouth of 
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of 
force against the victim or a third person.59 
The Trial Chamber in the Kunarac and others case agreed that these ele-
ments, if proved, constitute the actus reus of the crime of rape in international 
law. However, that Chamber considers that the “Furundzija definition”, alt-
hough appropriate to the circumstances of that case, is in one respect more 
narrowly and restrictively stated than required by international law. In stating 
that the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute rape only if accompa-
nied by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person, 
the “Furundzija definition”, according to the Kunarac and others Trial Chamber, 
does not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration 
non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.60 
The Trial Chamber in the Kvocka and others case agrees with the factors set 
forth in the Kunarac and others case, defining rape as a violation of sexual au-
tonomy. 
In considering allegations of rape, the Delalic and others Trial Chamber stre-
ssed that coercive conditions are inherent in situations of armed conflict.61 
As mentioned above, the ICTR’s jurisprudence has also accepted the „Ku-
narac and others definition“ in several cases62. Thus, it was confirmed in the 
Semanza case, that the „Akayesu definition“ enunciated a broad definition of 
rape, which included any physical invasion of a sexual nature in coercive cir-
cumstance and which was not limited to forcible sexual intercourse. The Ku-
narac and others case definition, in contrast, affirmed a narrower interpretation, 
indicating that consent must be given voluntarily and freely and is assessed 
within the context of the surrounding circumstances. The Semanza case Trial 
Chamber concluded that while such mechanical style of defining rape was ori-
ginaly rejected by the ICTR, the Chamber has found the comparative analysis 
59 Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 185.
60 Kunarac and others Trial Judgement, para. 438.
61 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, para. 495. See also Akayesu Trial Judgement, 
para. 688.
62 See supra note 58.
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in the Kunarac and others case to be persuasive and consequently adopted the 
Kunarac and others case definition.63
5 PROSECUTION OF RAPE
The ICTY’s Statute refers explicitly to rape as a crime against humanity 
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in Article 5(g). Rape may also amount to 
a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or 
customs of war, or an act of genocide. The jurisdiction to prosecute rape as 
an outrage against personal dignity, in violation of the laws or customs of war 
pursuant to the ICTY’s Statute (Art. 3), including the basis of common Article 
3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is also clearly established. Article 3 consti-
tutes an “umbrella rule”, which makes an open-ended reference to all rules of 
international humanitarian law.64  
	A			Rape	as	a	Crime	against	Humanity
Crime against humanity was recognized for the first time after the 2nd 
World War (in 1945) in Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Art. 
6c). According to this document, crimes against humanity are: “murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial 
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated”.65
The targeting of a collective in the form of a civilian population rather than 
the individual victim, place crime against humanity among the gravest of the 
crimes.
In compliance with the ICTR’s Statute (Art. 3) and the ICTY’s Statute 
(Art. 5), crimes against humanity represents a substantive group of internati-
onal crimes which must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack and directed against any civilian population on national, political, eth-
63 Semanza Trial Judgement, para. 344.
64 For example, Trial Chamber at Kunarac and others case recognized rape, torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity as constituting parts of serious violations of Common 
Article 3. See Kunarac and others Trial Judgement, para. 408.
65 On the origin of the crimes against humanity see more for example: Cassese, Interna-
tional Criminal Law (2003), at 68 – 74.
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nic, racial or religious grounds. This element is what distinguishes crimes against 
humanity from ordinary crimes and all that can be found in the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan armed conflicts.66 According to those Articles, rape is recognized as a 
crime against humanity.67 
B	Rape	as	a	serious	war	crime
The ICTY’s Statute (Art. 3) also prohibits other serious violations of custo-
mary international law, however, without explicitly referring to rape.68 Never-
theless, the gravity of rape was emphasized in several ICTY cases. 
The Delalic and others Trial Judgment confirmed that there can be no doubt 
that rape and other forms of sexual assault are expressly prohibited under in-
ternational humanitarian law.69 
According to the Furundzija case opinion it is indisputable that rape and 
other serious sexual assaults in armed conflicts entail criminal liability of the 
perpetrators. The right to physical integrity is a fundamental one, and is unde-
niably part of customary international law.70
In keeping with such jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac 
and others case confirmed previous decisions and concluded that rape meets 
66 It should be emphasized that crime against humanity can be committed during the 
time of any type of armed conflict, and also in times of peace. This opinion was first 
confirmed in the Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council at the time of 
the adoption of the ICTY Statute. In this report the Secretary-General explicitly 
refused to qualify armed conflict as an ingredient of crime against humanity and he 
concluded: “Crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are 
prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, interna-
tional or internal in character.“ Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to para. 2 
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), para. 47 (emphasis added).
67 Together with murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, tor-
ture, persecutions on political, racial and religious ground etc.
68 The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case outlined four requirements to trigger Article 
3 of the ICTY’s Statute: 1) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of 
international humanitarian law; 2) the rule must be customary in nature; 3) the vio-
lation must be “serious” – it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important 
values; 4) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, 
the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdicti-
on, IT-94-1-AR72, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 94.
69 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, para. 476.
70 Furundzija Trial Judgement, paras. 169 – 170.
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these requirements and, therefore, constitutes a recognized war crime under 
customary international law, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute.71 
C	Rape	as	Torture
Torture in times of armed conflict is specifically prohibited by international 
treaty law, in particular by the 1949 Geneva Conventions72 and the two 1977 
Additional Protocols.73 The term “torture“, in accordance with the 1984 Con-
vention against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physi-
cal or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtai-
ning from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.74 
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture, human rights bodies, and legal 
scholars have listed several acts that are considered severe enough per se to 
constitute torture and those that are likely to constitute torture depending on 
the circumstances.75 
The vicious and ignominious practice can take on various forms, including 
rape. As it was confirmed at the Kvocka and others Trial Judgement, beating, 
71 The universal criminalization of rape in domestic jurisdictions, the explicit prohibi-
tions contained in the Geneva Convention IV and in the Additional Protocols I 
and II, and the recognition of the seriousness of the offence in the jurisprudence of 
international bodies, including the European Commission on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 
Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Judgement in the Appeal Chamber (hereinafter: 
Kunarac and others Appeal Judgement), IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, 
para. 195. 
72 See Art. 3 common to all 1949 Geneva Conventions; Art. 12 and 50 of Geneva 
Convention I; Art. 12 and 51 of Geneva Convention II; Art. 13, 14 and 130 of Ge-
neva Convention III; Art. 27, 32 and 147 of Geneva Convention IV.
73 Art. 75 of Additional Protocol I and Art. 4 of Additional Protocol II.
74 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Tre-
atment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Art. 1(1).
75 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Tre-
atment or Punishment, UN Doc A/56/156, 3 July 2001, para. 8.
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sexual violence, prolonged denial of sleep, food, hygiene, and medical assistan-
ce, as well as threats to torture, rape, or killing relatives were among the acts 
most commonly mentioned as those likely to constitute torture. Mutilation of 
body parts would be an example of acts per se constituting torture.76
The Trial Chamber in the Furundzija case concluded that Article 3 of the 
Statute covers torture and outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.77 
Moreover, torture by means of rape is a particularly grave form of torture.78 For 
rape to be categorized as torture, both the elements of rape and the elements 
of torture must be present.
According to the ICTR’s jurisprudence set forth in the Akayesu case, rape 
was used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discri-
mination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape 
represents a violation of personal dignity and constitutes torture when inflic-
ted by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.79 
In the Delalic and others case, the Trial Chamber also considered the issue 
of torture through rape.80 The Trial Chamber indicated that the severity of the 
pain or suffering is a distinguishing characteristic of torture that sets it apart 
from similar offences.81 Summarizing the international case-law, that Chamber 
concluded that rape involves the infliction of suffering at a required level of 
severity to place it in the category of torture.82 
The existing case-law of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals has not 
determined the absolute degree of pain required for an act to amount to tor-
ture; however, severe pain or suffering as a consequence of rape was accepted 
76 Kvocka and others Trial Judgement, para. 144.
77 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Decision on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 
13 and 14 of the Indictment (Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction), 29 May 1998, 
para. 3.
78 Furundzija Trial Judgement, para. 295; Zelenovic Sentencing Judgement, para. 36.
79 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 597.
80 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, paras. 475 – 496.
81 The Appeals Chamber overturned the Appellant’s convictions under Art. 3 of the 
ICTY’s Statute as improperly cumulative in relation to Art. 2 of the Statute, but the 
Trial Chamber’s extensive analysis of torture and rape remains persuasive. Groun-
ding its analysis in a thorough survey of the jurisprudence of international bodies, 
the Trial Chamber concluded that rape may constitute torture. Delalic and others 
Trial Judgement, paras. 468, 491.
82 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, para. 489.
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in many cases.83 In certain circumstances, the suffering in the context of rape 
can be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions and it should take into 
account the specific social, cultural and religious background of the victims 
when assessing the severity of the alleged conduct.84
In the opinion issued by the Commission on Human Rights it is also stated 
that the severe suffering which rape causes to its victims necessitates that it be 
defined as a form of inhuman treatment. Sexual violence necessarily gives rise 
to severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, and in this way justifies 
its characterization as an act of torture.85 
D	Rape	as	a	Crime	of	Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide from 1948 (hereinafter: the 1948 Genocide Convention),86 defines ge-
nocide as an act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.87 It consists of five basic acts of 
violence: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group condi-
tions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and e) 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.88 
Genocide constitutes a very serious act of violence not connected with the 
existence of an armed conflict (even though it is usually followed by this 
type of circumstances); it could be committed even in times of peace.89 It is 
83 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, paras. 475 – 493; Furundzija Trial Judgement, 
paras. 163, 171; Kunarac and others Appeal Judgement, para. 150. 
84 Delalic and others Trial Judgement, para. 495; Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Fatmir Li-
maj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, Second Amended Indictment, IT-03-66-PT, 12 Fe-
bruary 2004, para. 237.
85 See Commission on Human Rights, 48th session, Summary Record of the 21st Mee-
ting, 11 February 1992, Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21, 21 February 1992, para. 35: 
“Since it was clear that rape or other forms of sexual assault against women held 
in detention were a particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and 
right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act 
of torture.“
86 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Decem-
ber 9 1948, 78 UNTS 277.
87 Ibid., Art. 2.
88 Loc. cit.
89 Ibid., Art. 1.
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generally recognized as “the worst of all crimes“and is found in many national 
legislations, and also in the case-law of various international courts.
The essential element that makes genocide far worse than other “ordinary“ 
international crimes, and represents its dominant characteristic is dolus specialis 
– the special intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a given group that has 
been strictly defined. The case-law of the international courts indicates that 
there is lack of evidence of such a specific genocidal intention on the part of 
the perpetrator.
In the Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber found that acts of rape and sexual 
violence formed an integral part of the process of destruction of the Tutsi 
as a group and could, therefore, constitute genocide. These rapes resulted in 
physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their 
communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruc-
tion, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their 
destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. It was a step 
in the process of destruction of spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself in the 
Tutsi group.90 
The Trial Chambers in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case concurred with 
this view. That Chamber also referred to the International Law Commission, 
which stated that in the process of committing genocide it is not necessary to 
intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of 
the globe.91 A partial destruction of a group is enough to constitute a crime of 
genocide.
Similar to that, the mass rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herze-
govina imposed conditions on the group that contribute to their physical de-
struction in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention’s provisions. Healey 
concludes that this destruction includes the murder of rape victims and the 
creation of an environment of fear in the community brought on by the rapes, 
which are often committed in public. This fear sometimes forces the civilian 
population to flee their homes and become dispersed, contributing to the de-
struction of the group.92
Furthermore, the rape and forced impregnation should be considered 
90 Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras. 731 – 732. For the confirmation of that opinion see 
also Musema Trial Judgement, para. 933.
91 Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1-T, 21 
May 1999, para. 95, referring to 1996 ILC Draft Code, at 42.
92 Healey, supra note 1, at 370.
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as preventing births within the group in violation of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention’s provisions.93 The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case concluded 
that the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should be con-
strued as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, 
separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies, 
where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an 
example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case 
where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated 
by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child 
who will consequently not belong to its mother’s group.94 For example, to the 
Muslim population forced impregnation of women is particular destructive 
because under Islamic law and culture, the ethnicity of children is determined 
by the ethnicity of the father.95 The children being born of a Serbian man and 
a Muslim woman is effectively transferred out of the Muslim group. 
Furthermore, that measures intended to prevent births within the group 
may be physical, but can also be mental. Rape can thus be a measure intended 
to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in 
the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, 
not to procreate.96 The genocidal logic of rape for impregnation is not only 
that it threatens the targeted people’s reproductive potential. Any mass killing 
threatens reproduction by limiting the number of reproducers. Any rape threa-
tens reproduction because it renders survivors damaged goods in a patriarchal 
system that defines the woman as a man’s possession, whereas the virgin is 
seen as his most valuable asset.97
Genocidal rape aimed at enforced pregnancy and eventual childbirth erases 
the cultural identity of the victim, the very characteristic that ostensibly made 
that person an enemy in the first place.98 Unfortunately, forced impregnation 
of women in war has historically been treated as a by-product of rape, rather 
than as a specific crime worthy of its own remedy. However, there have been 
numerous instances where Serbian soldiers have raped for the express purpose 
93 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 2(d).
94 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507.
95 Davis, supra note 4, at 1237.
96 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 508.
97 Allen, Rape Warfare, The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (1996), at 
96.
98 Ibid., at 101.
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of making sure the victims gave birth to their babies. Captured soldiers admit 
to having raped women and young girls in an effort to ethnically cleanse the 
community, and some contend that they were ordered to commit the rapes by 
their commanding officers and threatened with death if they refused. Usually, 
superior officers ordered their soldiers to prove their ethnic superiority and 
love to their country or religion, by killing or sexually assaulting women. For 
instance, in the course of one of the rapes, Dragoljub Kunarac expressed with 
verbal physical aggression his view that the rapes against the Muslim women 
were one of the many ways in which the Serbs could assert their superiority 
and victory over the Muslims.99
Consequently, the mass rapes and forced impregnations carried out cons-
ciously and methodically are calculated to bring about the physical destructi-
on of the group and thus they fall within the purview of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.
6 CONCLUSION 
Every rape is inconceivable horror. As it was mentioned in the Tadic case: 
“… [people] could, perhaps, explain it to themselves when somebody steals 
something from them, or even beatings or even some killings. Somehow they 
sort of accepted it in some way, but when the rapes started they lost all hope. 
Until then they had hope that this war could pass, that everything would quiet 
down. When the rapes started, everybody lost hope, everybody in the camp, 
both men and women. There was such fear, horrible…”100
Furthermore, as it was established in the Stakic case – for a woman, rape is 
by far the worst offence, sometimes even worse than death because it brings 
shame on her.101 Witness of the rape in the Musema case concluded that rape 
and “… what they did to her was worse than death…”.102 
Women in war have been raped for centuries - multiple times, by multiple 
perpetrators, by groups, in front of their families; they have been raped until 
99 Kunarac and others Trial Judgement, para. 583.
100 The statement of Vasif Gutic, prisoner at Trnopolje camp. See Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, Opinion and Judgement in the Trial Chamber, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para. 
175.
101 Prosecutor v. Miomir Stakic, Judgement in the Trial Chambers II, IT-97-24-T, 31 July 
2003, para. 803.
102 Musema Trial Judgement, para. 933.
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they became pregnant and held in captivity until they could no longer safely 
obtain an abortion. It is a horror, without any doubt. 
Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, it may be said that we have 
more means to investigate and prosecute different forms of sexual violence. In 
recent years, a significant degree of progress has been made. The ICTY and the 
ICTR have been prosecuting rape and other crimes of sexual violence. Those 
Tribunals have the opportunity to clarify international law and explicitly 
recognize rape as an international crime. The law of rape and sexual violence 
continues to evolve through the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. 
That being said, the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war is 
a matter of security (national, as well as international). However, the weighty 
decision to convict and punish a rapist should be based on clear and well-
established criteria. It should not to be allowed that the proceedings against 
rapists turn into a perverted process insulting for the victims and inflicting 
them with additional trauma. 
It must, first and foremost, be fair to the rape victim. 
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Zusammenfassung
sandra Fabijanić Gagro*
das verBreChen der verGeWaLtIGUnG In 
der reChtspreChUnG des InternatIonaLen 
straFGerIChtshoFes FÜr das ehemaLIGe jUGosLaWIen 
Und des InternatIonaLen straFGerIChtshoFes 
FÜr rUanda
Obwohl Frauen an bewaffneten Konflikten auch als Soldatinnen mitwirken, sind 
sie dennoch in der überwiegenden Zahl Opfer. Gewalt gegen Frauen in Kriegszeiten ist 
nicht nur ein Akt sexueller Gewalt, sondern auch eine Methode der Kriegsführung, ein 
Instrument der Rache und Demütigung, durch das nicht nur Missachtung gegenüber den 
Frauen, sondern auch gegenüber ihren männlichen Partnern und sogar der Nation, der 
sie angehören, demonstriert wird. Die Tätigkeit und Rechtsprechung des Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshofes für das ehemalige Jugoslawien sowie des Internationalen Strafgerichts-
hofes für Ruanda machen die offenkundige Tatsache deutlich, dass das Verbrechen der 
Vergewaltigung nicht mehr allein unter die Zuständigkeit der innerstaatlichen Gesetzge-
bung fällt, sondern als internationales Verbrechen erkannt und anerkannt wurde, sodass 
es im Zusammenhang des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit, des Kriegsverbrechens 
und – sofern das Merkmal der mens rea erfüllt ist – sogar des Völkermords zu betrachten 
ist. Die Tatsache, dass viele Frauen unter dem Einfluss traditioneller patriarchalischer 
und strenger religiöser Systeme nicht zugeben wollen, was ihnen widerfahren ist, ist be-
merkenswert und erschreckend zugleich. In vielen Fällen ist es für die vergewaltigte Frau 
eine Schande, Opfer einer Vergewaltigung geworden zu sein.
Schlüsselwörter: bewaffnete Konflikte, Vergewaltigung, Internationaler Strafgerichtshof 
für das ehemalige Jugoslawien, Internationaler Strafgerichtshof für Ruanda, Verbrechen 
gegen die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen des Völkermords
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zLočIn sILovanja U praksI meĐUNARODNOG KAZNENOG 
TRIBUNALA ZA BIVŠU JUGOSLAVIJU I MEĐUNARODNOG 
KAZNENOG TRIBUNALA ZA RUANDU
Unatoč tome što žene u oružanim sukobima sudjeluju kao vojnici, one su uglavnom 
ipak žrtve. Nasilje nad ženama tijekom ratnih vremena nije samo čin seksualnog nasilja, 
već i metoda ratovanja, odnosno instrument osvete i sredstvo izražavanja nepoštivanja i 
omalovažavanja ne samo žene, već i “njenog” muškarca, pa čak i nacije kojoj žena pripada. 
Aktivnost i sudska praksa Međunarodnog kaznenog tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju i 
Međunarodnog kaznenog tribunala za Ruandu ukazale su na očitu činjenicu da zločin 
silovanja nije više u nadležnosti samo unutarnjeg zakonodavstva pojedine države, već 
se radi o zločinu priznatom i prepoznatom kao međunarodni zločin – taj se zločin može 
sagledati u kontekstu zločina protiv čovječnosti, ratnog zločina, pa čak i (u slučajevima 
postojanja elementa mens rea) zločina genocida. Činjenica da mnoge žene u praksi ne 
priznaju što im se dogodilo – pod utjecajem tradicionalnih patrijarhalnih i strogih 
religioznih sustava, u isto je vrijeme i zanimljiva i zastrašujuća. U mnogim slučajevima 
biti žrtva silovanja jest sramota za silovanu ženu. 
Ključne riječi: oružani sukobi, silovanje, Međunarodni kazneni tribunal za bivšu 
Jugoslaviju, Međunarodni kazneni tribunal za Ruandu, zločin protiv čovječnosti, ratni 
zločin, zločin genocida
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